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THE TAX TREATMENT OF A DISPOSITION
OF PROFESSIONAL GOOD WILL
TOBIAS WEISSJ
TAx planning for the professions and other personal service enterprises 1
has been a lure for much of the finest legal talent. Particular attention has
been given to the retirement of the owners of a professional practice and the
ultimate disposition of their interests.2 The good will owned or controlled by
the participants invariably becomes a principal consideration in such disposi-
tions. In contrast to other assets stamped for tax purposes by their origin in
personal service, good will conventionally has been viewed as an opportunity
for realizing capital gain rather than ordinary income.3 The consequences of a
disposition of professional good will therefore occupy a focal position in many
of the plans proposed to minimize the taxation of professional practitioners.
Despite the extensive interest of tax planners in professional good will as
a means of achieving capital gains, little analysis has been made of the premises
on which their forecasts are constructed. Taxpayer counselling services, per-
haps reticent to suggest questions which might jeopardize the advantages which
their advice purports to bestow, have done little to stimulate inquiry. While
the Internal Revenue Service might be expected to be less inhibited, its activity
in this area has been fragmentary, difficult to understand, and limited to re-
sponses to particular taxpayer provocations. The courts have merely reflected
the stereotypes which both taxpayer representatives and the Service have
adopted from areas of illusory similarity.
From each of these sources the approach to the subject of professional good
will has been molded by the concepts and rules applied to industrial or com-
mercial good will. In essence, good will is a compact judgment of future earn-
ings, a reduction to present value of expected future income.4 In a business
venture, good will commonly attaches to an aggregate of nonpersonal objects,
tangible or intangible, such as real estate or fixed assets or a brand name. In
a professional venture, however, such property is typically of minimal impor-
tance; instead, the practitioner himself is the primary fount of good will. This
tMember, Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Although the term "profession" is used in its commonly accepted meaning to in-
clude all of the learned pursuits, the discussion applies as well to any personal service
business, such as that of a broker or an insurance agent. The patron or customer will
generally be called the "client"
2. The interest in, preparing for a participant's withdrawal from a personal service
venture, whether on retirement or death or some other occasion involving a termination
or reduction of his interest, has caused an, outbreak of activity on several fronts. See, e.g.,
the recently enacted Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 401; and recent st~te statutes permitting professional practice in associa-
tion, or corporation. form, note 140 infra.
3. Tenen, Tax Problems of Service Partnerships, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
137-67 (1958) ; WILLIS, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERSuIP TAXATION § 30.08 (1957) (discuss-
ing general problems of partnership taxation) ; John W. Wolcott, 39 T.C. 538 (1962).
4. See Heath, Property Valuation Problems and the Accountant, 117 Jouax. OF
ACcOuNTAxcY 54 (1964) ; Note, 63 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1528 (1963).
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distinction between property and person, regardless of the criticism which may
be leveled at it, is well entrenched in tax dogma; it has been consistently
recognized that liability for future income can be severed by transferring the
property out of which the income grows, whereas future income from personal
service is beyond severance from the transferor.5 In an attempt to convey pro-
fessional good will, it only obscures the implications of the personal nature of
such good will and impedes an understanding of the proper tax treatment to
view the transaction in the same manner as a conveyance of industrial or
commercial good will.
Determining whether a disposition of professional good will is productive of
capital gain or ordinary income requires a consideration of a broad array of
fundamental questions. In probing these problems, the ensuing discussion ex-
plores the implications of two groups of standards. An initial inquiry will
seek to develop the standards which ought to be used in isolating and identify-
ing more closely the thing which is loosely labeled professional good will, as
well aq in analyzing what happens when its transfer is attempted. Thereafter, by
considering the applicable principles of taxation and applying them to three
principal classes of purported good will dispositions, it should be possible to
determine whether profits from good will dispositions ought to be treated as
capital gain or ordinary income.
THE NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL GOOD WILL
1. Professional Good Will as a Transferable Asset
The separable and disposable nature of the good will of a practitioner of a
profession was the subject of consideration and controversy before the Federal
income tax was adopted, 6 and has continued to come into question after that
time in respects unrelated to taxes.7 Many courts have been inclined to deny
the existence of such good will as a transferable commodity, reasoning that it
is the embodiment of the skill, experience and personality of the practitioner,
5. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) ; Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ;
Pelham G. Wodehouse, 8 T.C. 637 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir.
1949).
6. McCurry v. Gibson, 108 Ala. 451, 18 So. 806 (1895) (physician) ; Cook v. Johnson,
47 Conn. 175 (1879) (dentist) ; Hoyt v. Holly, 39 Conn. 326 (1872) (physician) ; Pohl-
man v. Dawson, 63 Kan. 471, 65 Pac. 689 (1901) (barber); Smith v. Smith, 51 La. Ann.
72, 24 So. 618 (1898) (insurance agency); Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 81 N.E. 199
(1907) (dentist) ; Tierney v. Klein, 67 Miss. 173, 6 So. 739 (1889) (insurance agency) ;
Read v. Mackey, 47 Misc. 435, 95 N.Y. Supp. 935 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (broker) ; Cowan
v. Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 212 (1896) (newspaper publisher).
7. Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 2d 294, 325 P.2d 463 (1958) (advertising agency - conver-
sion action on partnership split-up) ; Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245 (1956)
(dental laboratory - property division on divorce) ; Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. Ch. 589,
135 A.2d 128 (1957) (CPA - accounting on. partnership split-up) ; Harshbarger v. Eby,
28 Idaho 753, 156 Pac. 619 (1916) (physician - action to recover sale price) ; Siddall
v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959) (lawyer - accounting on
partnership split-up) ; Durio v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 82, 358 P.2d 703 (1961) (veterinarian
- action for sales price) ; Macfadden v. Jenkins, 40 N.D. 422, 169 N.W. 151 (1918)
(real estate agency - accounting for sales proceeds) .
1964] 1159
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
enveloping his relationship with his clients, and as such is no more separable
from him than his reputation.3 Such a view continues to persist in some places,
and is reflected, for example, in the restriction, as a matter of internal profes-
sional regulation, against the sale by lawyers of their professional good will.,
Other jurisdictions recognize that a professional practitioner who enjoys the
allegiance of clients can take measures, which other practitioners consider to
be of value and for which they are willing to pay good consideration, to in-
fluence the transfer of that allegiance to another member of the same profes-
sion.10
An insight into the merits of these views may be suggested by identifying
the "good will" with which they deal. While the intangible nature of good will
has lent itself more readily to a variety of extended commentary than precise
definition,"1 for the practitioner of a profession it can be identified essentially
as the desire on the part of his clients to continue to seek his services.12 A
sale of that good will is an attempt to shift that future client patronage to
another practitioner. Future client favor, in the best of circumstances, cannot
be taken as a certainty, but must be approached rather in terms of probability;
and, where an effort is made to transfer the patronage, that probability is
likely to be affected.' 3
8. Cook v. Lauten, 1 Ili. App. 2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414 (1954) (CPA); Smith v.
Smith, 51 La. Ann. 72, 24 So. 618 (1898) ; Pollock v. Ralston, 5 Wash. 2d 36, 104 P.2d
934 (1940) (sales agency); Siddall v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 46-47, 185 N.Y.S.2d
630, 632-33 (1959) (lawyer).
9. American Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Opinion 266 (June 21, 1945) ; DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 161, 189 (1953). These restrictions
apply to a sale to a buyer who is not a partner of the seller, and as to such cases Opinion
266, supra, declares that "Clients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They
have nothing to sell but personal service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients would
appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional status."
10. Cf. Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 2d 294, 325 P.2d 463 (1958) ; Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del.
Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957) ; Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 81 N.E. 199 (1907) ; Slack
v. Suddoth, 102 Tenn. 375, 52 S.E. 180 (1899). As to sale of good will by lawyers in
England, see Payment for Partnership Goodwill, 227 THE LAW TIMES 145 (1959). There
is no professional prohibition in the United States against sale of a CPA practice. CAREY,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 206 (1956); but cf. Lynch
v. Baily, 275 App. Div. 527, 532, 90 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363, aff'd 300 N.Y. 615, 90 N.E.2d
484 (1949).
11. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 237, 241; 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION § 18.16 (1942); McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L.
REV. 645 (1959) ; Note, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 660
(1953).
12. See Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406, 411, 24 S.E. 212, 212-13 (1896), stating
that a professional "often creates an, intangible but valuable property by winning the
confidence of his patrons and securing immunity from successful competition for their
business." See, e.g., the statutory definitions in CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 14100;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-1111 (1963); OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 60, § 315 (1949).
Cf. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1888).
13. "It is the sale of a mere chance that a preference which has usually been extended
will continue." Johnson v. Friedhoff, 7 Misc. 484, 486, 27 N.Y. Supp. 982 (Sup. Ct.
1894). See also Harshbarger v. Eby, 28 Idaho 753, 761, 156 Pac. 619, 621 (1916) ; Finch
v. Michael, 167 N.C. 322, 324-25, 84 S.E. 458, 460 (1914).
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Whether professional good will can be transferred, therefore, is not a ques-
tion which can be answered by formulating an absolute rule either affirming
or denying its fungible character in all cases. In some professions, such as
public accounting, good will appears to be more susceptible to transfer than
in others, such as law or medicine, and within any profession the degree of
transferability can be determined only in the context of the specific circum-
stances of the practitioner, his clients, and the purchaser.14 From this stand-
point, the individual situation must be examined not only to see whether there
exists any transferable good will at all, but, accepting an approach based on
degrees of transferability, to determine the extent to which such good will is
present and the amount of the purchase price reasonably allocable to it.' 5
Of the two lines of cases, then, the courts which adopt a rule that profes-
sional good will is transferable, acknowledging that the opportunity of client
succession is an element of some value, often come closer to reality, although
occasionally they underestimate the impact of varying circumstances. Those
of the opposing view, in dogmatically emphasizing the personal quality of
professional good will, have insufficiently distinguished the end product from
its source; they fail to recognize that developed good will may be severable
even though its source may have been the personality of the practitioner.16
2. Requirements for Disposing of Transferable Good Will
Assuming that in a specific situation professional good will is a vendable
commodity, it nevertheless is not automatically transferred by a contractual
provision to that effect. The provision for a transfer of professional good will
can only be made effective through accompanying steps which are reasonably
calculated to produce a client severance and succession.' 7 Some supporting
arrangement or factual pattern which shows in reality that a transferor de-
finitively is parting with client patronage, or at least that plausible measures
are being taken to shift that patronage to a transferee, is required. Whether
the measures taken have a sufficient capacity to produce that result is ulti-
mately a factual question to be answered in the context of the circumstances
of the specific case.
A variety of factors may be relevant. The physical place of business may in
some instances be significant in influencing the continued patronage of existing
clients.' 8 The exclusive right to the use of the name of a practitioner or firm,
or to refer to a transferee as the successor of a particular individual or firm,
may be some basis for inducing continued client patronage. The records of the
14. See, e.g., Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961).
15. Cf. Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 47.
16. See Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 2d 294, 302, 325 P.2d 463, 468 (1958) ; Laube, Good
Will In Professional Partnerships, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 326 (1927).
17. Cf. Tierney v. Klein, 67 Miss. 173, 6 So. 739 (1889); Rice v. Angell, 73 Tex.
350, 11 S.W. 338 (1889) ; Pollock v. Ralston, 5 Wash. 2d 36, 104 P.2d 934 (1940) ; Rod-
ney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
18. John Sumers, 36 T.C. 467 (1961) ; cf. Smith v. Davidson, 198 Ga. 231, 31 S.E.2d
477 (1944); Morris Zeltzernafr, 34 T.C. 73, aff'd per curiam, 283 F.2d 514 (1st Cir.
1960).
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practitioner may have value in the effort to channel clients to a successor. 19
Even in the absence of such factors, an agreement for a shift in good will may
nevertheless be a realistic one in the context of a history of client relations
which shows little erosion of client patronage and points to the element of
service rendered to clients, rather than to the person of the particular prac-
titioner, as the more persuasive factor in retaining that patronage.20
It would appear, however, that none of these factors is likely to shift pro-
fessional good will significantly without a concomitant commitment on the
part of the transferor, which is either obligatory under law or at least volun-
tarily observed, to abstain from seeking the patronage of the clients which is
the subject of the good will transfer.21 In a commercial or manufacturing
enterprise in which plant or equipment, sales outlets, an employee organiza-
tion, or the attributes of a physical product are the most important elements
in attracting customers, or where an intangible such as a process or a trade
name not dependent on the person of the vendor is the basis of customer ac-
ceptance, good will may be transferable through the conveyance of the one or
more of these objects through which it is controlled. But the professional
practitioner usually has no such external artifact in which his good will is
embodied. His good will is dependent rather on his continuing personal re-
lations with his clients. A purported transferor, left free to continue to do
business with those clients, can seriously disrupt or negate his transferee's
efforts to retain the clients, regardless of the configuration of other factors.
The putative transferor thereby may keep himself poised to compete effective-
ly for the future allegiance of those clients and substantially to retrieve that
which he has allegedly surrendered. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
identify in such circumstances a measurable shift in professional good will. In
order to assure an ascertainable severance of such good will, therefore, the
arrangement normally should be accompanied, regardless of the other elements
of the transaction, by an obligation or undertaking of the transferor not to
complete for the patronage of those clients; alternatively there should at least
exist a practical equivalent in the form of circumstances which eliminate the
possibility of such competition.22
An express covenant not to compete represents such an obligation.2 3 Where
19. George J. Aitken, 35 T.C. 227 (1960) ; Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962);
Savings Assurance Agency, Inc., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 225 (1963).
20. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962) (group medical practice);
Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961) (clinical orthodontist practice).
21. Cf. Yandell v. United States, 315 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1963) ; but cf. Commissioner
v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963), affirming T.C. Memo. 1961-83.
22. Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175, 36 Am. Rep. 62 (1879) ; Rutan v. Coolidge, 241
Mass. 584, 136 N.E. 257 (1922). See Hunt v. Street, 182 Tenm. 167, 174, 184 S.W.2d 553,
555 (1945). Cf. Yandell v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 306 (D. Ore. 1962) ; Blake, Em-
ployee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 646-47, 652 (1960); Miller,
Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before and Under the 1954
Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1954).
23. Cook v. Johnson, supra note 22; Kohlman v. Dawson, 63 Kan. 471, 65 Pac. 689
(1901) ; Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 212 (1896) ; cf. Rutan v. Coolidge,
241 Mass. 584, 136 N.E. 257 (1922).
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there is a disposition of a practice without such an express covenant, there
may be a question whether the covenant nevertheless should be inferred from
the purported transfer.2 If under local law the omission is thus cured by
judicial construction,2 5 it generally should suffice to sustain an attempt to
transfer good will. There are courts, however, which are reluctant to inter-
polate in this manner in order to cure the omission of an express obligation, 26
and in such event, barring circumstances with substantially equivalent effect,
the alleged good will transfer normally would be ineffective. In the absence
of an express or implied covenant, competition nevertheless may be substan-
tially eliminated as a result of circumstances such as the disability or death 2T
of the practitioner or his permanent removal to a distant location. Such de
facto restrictions may produce approximately the same effect for purposes of
establishing a transfer of professional good will as a covenant not to com-
pete.28 There have even been situations in which, absent an express covenant
or equivalent circumstantial safeguard, a practitioner has nevertheless volun-
tarily refrained from professional relations with old clients or sought to per-
suade them to patronize his successor, and this voluntary abstention or affirm-
ative assistance has been found sufficient to support an enforceable promise to
pay for good will.20
3. Total Disposition of Good Will
A sale of a professional practice normally includes an agreement for the
total, immediate disposition by the seller of his good will. This is the simplest
case of a professional good will disposition, in which the severance require-
ment just discussed can be readily satisfied by the seller. The intention of the
parties is that the seller should withdraw completely from the practice, sur-
rendering entirely and as promptly as possible his control of his clients and
24. 1 BARRETr & SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 187-89 (1956); 2 ROWLEY,
PARTNERSHIPS § 45.6 (2d ed. 1960).
25. Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 81 N.E. 199 (1907).
26. See Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957).
27. Alfred Muerlin, 25 T.C. 118 (1955); cf. Savings Assurance Agency, Inc., 22
CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 200 (1962), finding in, its special circumstances that a transfer of an
insurance business could not include a transfer of good will where the proprietor had
already died.
28. Cf. Ray H. Schulz, 34 T.C. 235 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961);
Blake, supra note 22 at 655.
29. Hoyt v. Holly, 39 Conn. 326, 12 Am. Rep. 390 (1872); Evans v. Gunnip, 36
Del. Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957). Cf. the companion cases of Herbert M. La Rue, 37
T.C. 39 (1961) and Charles H. Girt, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1637 (1961). Whether a
purported transfer of good will should be recognized for tax purposes where it is de-
pendent on such voluntary behavior is seriously questionable, at least until after a period
of sufficient duration substantially to duplicate for the transferee the opportunities which
would have resulted, if the transferor had bound, himself with a covenant not to compete.
In such cases it would appear proper to view the transaction in. terms of the analogy of
a unilateral contract which arises only after the promisee has completed performance of
his part of the bargain; and, under this analysis, the operative dispositive event would
occur not at the time the parties made their arrangement but when this period of for-
bearance or performance had elapsed.
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his enjoyment of their patronage. An immediate severance may not always
occur, however, some ties between the seller and the practice being retained
for transitional purposes either at the insistence of the buyer or the seller.
But these purposes are identifiable; the participation of the seller continues
on a much modified scale and for only a relatively short time.30
The amount of the consideration paid for the good will is often measured
by the anticipated earnings of the practice, as by a multiple of one year's
income or of average income over a longer period. Once the amount is thus
determined, the fact and time of payment may be unrelated to the income of
the transferor's practice, as where the payment is made in a single lump amount
or in a variety of installments which are obligatory independent of the earn-
ings of the practice. In addition, however, the payment itself may be con-
ditioned on the presence of future earnings from the transferee's practice, be-
ing cast as a percentage of the income which is to be earned by the practice.
Despite the measurement and dependence of the payment on future earnings
of the practice, even to the point of being a share of those earnings and there-
by assuming the operating risks of reduced or nonexistent earnings, the
severance requirements for a transfer of the good will can be met under the
standards heretofore discussed. On a complete withdrawal by the transferor,
regardless of the method of payment, client control can be shifted, the trans-
feror can divest himself of proprietary authority, and the transferee can take
full command of the practice.
A further element, through which payment for good will is dependent upon
future earnings, is sometimes present in such transactions. The transferor may
be deemed to have made a profit sharing arrangement with the transferee,
as a result of which he continues to be involved in the practice. It may thus
be said that this continuing interest prevents any asserted withdrawal and
sale of good will. Assuming a satisfaction of the nontax standards, it might
prove helpful further to dissect the transaction into two phases, the first of
which is a disposition of the good will, and the second of which is a placement
of the sales proceeds at the risk of the practice. A sale of the good will would
then be recognized, but in addition the seller would be found to have there-
after assumed a new position as an inactive partner or an investor or a creditor
of the practice. In that event, the subsequent payments out of the income of
the practice consist of a capital element, the recovery of the initial proceeds, and
an income element, the return of those proceeds in some form.
4. Partial Disposition of Good Will
There are recurring situations in which only a partial disposition of pro-
fessional good will is claimed to have been made. Satisfaction of the severance
requirements becomes considerably more difficult where the intended transfer
is limited to a portion of the transferor's good will or where the transfer,
although involving all the good will, is deferred to some future time rather
30. These transitional arrangements are considered in connection with partial disposi-
tions in the text at note 45 infra.
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than being effective when the arrangement is made. The first of such dis-
positions is partial in a quantitative sense, purporting immediately to split off
a portion of the volume of good will; the second is partial in a temporal sense,
dividing the time continuum in order to keep the entire good will in the trans-
feror for a stipulated period. A combination of these types may also be en-
countered, as illustrated by an arrangement between two practitioners under
which there is an asserted present sale of a portion of the good will and a
transfer of the balance at a later date.
The quantitative partial disposition has appeared in two basic forms. In one,
the transferor attempts to sever completely his good will while retaining
the good will of other clients and continuing to engage actively in his practice.
For example, an accountant 31 or an orthodontist 32 with several independent
offices at separate locations may sell one office and its good will. In effect,
however, a total immediate disposition is being made of the patrons at that
office, and as to that segment no further considerations are involved. Rather
than splitting off one of these offices through a sale, the transferor and trans-
feree may form a partnership, with the transferor remaining in one office and
the transferee supervising another one, at which he assumes a dominant
operating position and control of client relations. Again, the transferor can
sever his ties with the patrons of the latter office in accordance with the stand-
ards for a total immediate disposition. 33 In a second and more frequent kind
of partial disposition, the transferor in effect purports to share with other
persons some portion of his good will with the same clientele, so that the
transferor and transferee claim to enjoy jointly and simultaneously the favor
of the same patrons. This is a more complex feat to achieve.
These partial dispositions, purportedly involving a concurrent sharing or
a deferred severance of good will, have certain distinctive features. At the
time the dispositive arrangement is made, the claimed transferor does not as
31. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1956).
32. Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961).
33. The accuracy of this analysis of the situation is particularly clear where each
participant's profit share is somehow confined or substantially related to the income from
the office he supervises, and in, reality that is often likely to be the effect of the arrange-
ment. It is possible, however, for profits from all the offices to be pooled and for a division
of the profits to be made which has no strong relationship to office income, and as a result
of which, particularly where an established senior is admitting an anxious junior, the
profit division is weighted in favor of the senior so as to preserve for himself a portion
of the profit enjoyment of the office whose good will was sold. Thus, enjoyment of the
good will may in some measure be retained even though control has been surrendered.
In such a case the severance of control is the predominant factor, however, which dictates
a finding that, as a matter of fact, there has been a disposition of the good will of that
office. In the absence of control, the senior's continued enjoyment is at the mercy of the
transferee and bears some resemblance to the transaction consisting of a total disposition
for a consideration based on a share of the profits from the practice sold, discussed in
the text following note 30 supra.
The situation in essence would be the same where the practice has only one office, but
the seller and buyer who are forming a partnership agree on a transfer of control over
specific clients who theretofore had been part of the seller's clientele.
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a rule separate himself from the good will which is the subject of the arrange-
ment, but continues in a position to control and enjoy it. Consequently, he
remains, behind the facade of a disposition, strategically situated to retain the
allegiance of the clients involved. This deliberate continued participation of
the alleged transferor makes it inconsistent to expect him to enter into a
simultaneous and immediately effective covenant not to compete for the busi-
ness of those same clients. It is not logical in these circumstances, moreover,
to infer a comparable restriction against competition for that business. It is
therefore questionable, under the standards heretofore postulated, whether any
good will severance has occurred.
To give content to these general observations, it is helpful to refer briefly
to some specific situations in which partial dispositions are characteristic. A
senior practitioner may take in a junior as a partner, for which the junior
makes some payment 3 4 which variously is assigned to fixed assets, receiv-
ables, work-in-process, or good will. At this juncture of the union the con-
ditions for a severance of the senior's good will ordinarily are not met. In
order to protect and preserve his economic security, the senior's customary
intent at that time is retention rather than severance of the good will of his
clients.3 5 Even though the junior may in fact render the service and have
substantial relations with the clients, the senior is usually careful to maintain
at least his basic contacts with them and to remain in a position to influence
their future allegiance.36 To be sure, junior, if he is resourceful and the con-
ditions are opportune, may himself successfully exploit these contacts and
eventually wean away client allegiance. But seen at the inception of the union,
34. A payment need not always be made by the junior or other new entrant into such
a combination. An aging single practitioner, without receiving any payment, may want
a partner in order to protect against the hazards of disability, to furnish continuity of ser-
vice at other times of absence, and to create a prearranged market for the sale of his
practice at his death. In the absence of a payment in money or other property, however,
there is no occasion for a capital gain and the problems here discussed do not arise.
35. Compare the comment made with respect to the recently enacted Self-Employed
Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 401: "The bill singles
out for assistance a class of people, the self-employed, who as a group are, generally
speaking, least in need or deserving of assistance. The doctor, lawyer, or small business-
man is not forced to retire at a specified age. He typically builds up a practice or business,
takes in, younger associates, and continues to benefit from such practice or business well
beyond the earning years of the average employee." Minority views of Senators Douglas
and Gore, S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1961).
36. Comapre the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, INT. ReV.
CODE OF 1954, § 401, under which the earned income of a self-employed practitioner is
construed to include fees received with respect to services rendered by subordinates. The
applicable conditions are put as follows:
Under this concept of "earned income", the entire amount received by a self-em-
ployed individual as professional fees or commission will be treated as earned
income if the taxpayer is engaged in. the practice of a profession such as medicine
or law, even though he employs assistants to perform part or all of the services,
provided the patients or clients are those of the taxpayer and look to him as the
person responsible for the services rendered.
S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1961).
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the possibility of such a shift is speculative and not susceptible to measure-
ment and certainly not the product of an intentional grant by the senior. The
common experience is that the senior, who stays on independently or for a
prolonged period, neither isolates himself from his clients nor dissolves his
favored ties with them nor abstains from cultivating'their future patronage.
In such circumstances there appears to be insufficient factual basis for recog-
nizing a disposition of good will by him.
The admission of a junior as a partner may be motivated by the senior's
desire to expand his practice by tapping additional business available to him
through his established reputation. The junior fills his requirement for further
manpower, being professionally qualified but lacking a client-following. When
the junior makes a payment, purportedly for good will, at the outset of such
a combination, it is unlikely that the senior, in exchange, intends to shift his
client ties to the junior. Indeed, it is doubtful, even if he intended other-
wise, that the senior could restrict himself for that purpose without sub-
stantially damaging the capacity of the partnership to attract patronage, in
view of its special dependence on the reputation and position of the senior
as the key to the additional business needed to sustain the junior and make
the operation profitable. The junior's initial payment is rather for the good
will which the senior retains and intends to cultivate and for the senior's
related personal services in bringing in the clients, or at least for the use of
his name on behalf of the combination very much as in the case of a payment-
made for the use of a trade mark or a trade name. The payment may also be
viewed as an advance to the senior against future profits to be earned from the
expanded practice, representing an anticipatory realization of partnership
profits. The senior thereby increases his effective share of the income, while
the junior will be reimbursed from the portion of those profits which they
have agreed to attribute to him. 7 In no event is the payment likely to be made
for an actual shift in good will.
The established practitioner is often in a position to influence a client's
choice of a specialist or a practitioner in a contiguous area. The general prac-
titioner in law frequently finds that his clients need qualified tax advice; the
general dentist with a large children's practice is usually in the initial posi-
tion to detect the need for and recommend orthodontic service; the obstetri-
cian, developing a bond of confidence with his patients, can sway the selection
of a pediatrician. Payments made to practitioners for their referrals or recom-
mendations in such situations would clearly represent compensation for ser-
vices rather than payment for transfer of good will.38 Where the actual or
potential volume of referrals is large, both professional stature and monetary
37. The compensatory benefit to the senior may be in some form other than money
or its equivalent, as where the senior receives a larger share of current profits or con-
tributes lesser services with the intent of reducing the extent of his activity or arranges
a means for the disposition of his interests on death. But, as noted in note 34 supra, in the
absence of some payment the capital gains problem here discussed is not presented.
38. See Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128, 1135 (1961) ; cf. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343
U.s. 90 (1951).
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return may well indicate a partnership or group practice to be more advan-
tageous than a pattern of reference between separate practitioners, and again
the superior economic position of one of the parties may result in a payment
to him purportedly for good will. The basic nature of the payment, however,
remains unaltered despite the change in the relationship between the parties:
in essence, it is still compensation for referral services. The professional work
involved being of a type which the payee in no event can perform, the good
will of his own practice is not involved and a transfer of his own client patron-
age in his area of competence is not included. The most that he can do is to
route to others, practicing either separately or together with him, business
which they can and he cannot handle; it is for this referral service that the
payments are made.
In some professions, as in the case of an animal hospital of a veterinarian,
ownership of the physical facility is a prominent factor in fixing client patron-
age. Because of this interdependent relationship, the good will is not likely to
be sold without a simultaneous sale of the facility, though the good will may
be paid for separately. Where the owner of such a practice retains the facility
but purports to sell part of his good will, the disposition of good will is prob-
ably specious, the seller in fact maintaining client control through the facility
and reinforcing that position through his continued participation in the prac-
tice. An alleged partial disposition of good will is more likely to be accom-
panied by a corresponding sale of an interest in the facility. Such a disposition.
of a partial interest both in the facility and in the good will, approaches the
situations heretofore described in which a separable segment of a practice is
effectively split off. In those situations, however, the seller severed all ties with
the clients patronizing the segmented portion; here, despite the importance
of the facility, personal relations with clients constitute a significant factor and
the seller remains in an influential position through those continuing relations
to affect client patronage. Nor is this situation, because of the presence of this
personal element, in 'the same category as a partial disposition of physical plant
and good will in a manufacturing enterprise, as a result of which the buyer
acquires an interest in an end product. The professional practitioner would
put himself more in the position of such a seller if he were to deprive himself
of the future use of his name with respect to client patronage, and, as a con-
sequence, really satisfy the standards heretofore described for a severance and
transfer of professional good will. But a practitioner is not likely to disable
himself to that extent unless he contemplates complete withdrawal from the
practice, and the continuing participant will not be found to undertake such
extensive restraints. While the presence and importance of the physical facility
is a hybrid factor tending to make it more difficult to ascertain whether a dis-
position of professional good will has really 'been made, the applicable stand-
ards remain the same, and the burden ought to be put on the party asserting
a disposition to show that those standards have been satisfied.
Just as a senior may bring in a junior, two or more practitioners in an
existing partnership may admit additional members. These may be juniors
who come in on the same terms as have been described with respect to the
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single senior who takes on a junior, in which event the considerations hereto-
fore described are applicable, or instead the new members may be persons of
greater maturity and more advanced professional and economic development.
A single practitioner likewise may form a partnership with one or more other
individuals who are more closely his equal than his junior. Despite these
variations in the economic and professional levels of the participants, their
basic motivation remains unchanged: to protect his fundamental economic
position each of them with a client-following normally will seek to retain ex-
tensive control over the continued allegiance of his own clients.
In many of these combinations - after the parties are satisfied as to their
compatibility and capacity to function profitably - a formal agreement may be
executed binding each participant to transfer his good will to the others at his
retirement or death.39 Often a specific date for retirement during lifetime is
not fixed, and withdrawal due to death is uncertain as to time, so that the point
at which the good will transfer is to occur is entirely indeterminate. In other
agreements, however, a specific retirement date may be fixed, as where a senior
undertakes to withdraw after a specific period and to leave his practice'to the
junior, so that the time of the good will transfer becomes more definite. In a
third arrangement, a transfer of good will is required if the party is still a
member of the combination at the time of his death or retirement, whenever
it may occur, but he is left free at any prior time to withdraw from the com-
bination, together with his clients, before either of those events occurs, Final-
ly, such arrangements may contain a covenant not to compete effective with
the purchase of a partner's interest at retirement or death, though not operative
with respect to the promissor's own clients before the occurrence of one of
those events.
The choice made among these variables in a partnership agreement, regard-
less of how it otherwise affects the parties, is not likely to establish a good
will severance at the time the arrangement is made. At that time the good will
transfer is at best only prospective, and with respect to a particular practitioner
may never be consummated. In the meantime, each potential transferor re-
mains in a position to control and enjoy the good will of his clients. Any in-
tervening informal shift of client favor through association is likewise usually
contrary to the parties' mutual intent, and in any event is too speculative to
merit recognition. A recognizable conveyance of good will occurs, if at all,
only at a later date when the prospective transfer is converted into a present
effort to shift client allegiance, as marked by an immediately operative cove-
nant not to complete, or its circumstantial equivalent.
The fact that a stranger is willing to pay for the opportunity to join with
another practitioner is strong evidence that some benefit of actual or potential
value is sought from the payee. A present severance in client allegiance, how-
ever, is not typically part of that benefit where the payee intends to continue
39. Provisions in such agreements may deal as well with circumstances which are
treated as tantamount to retirement, such as a permanent major disability or a deliberate
failure to attend to the affairs of the practice. As a matter of internal professional regu-
lation, sale of good will to a partner may be permitted despite a prohibition against its
sale to a stranger. See note 9 supra.
1964] 1169
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
actively in the practice for a substantial period. In some instances the benefit
is in the form of an opportunity to enter a new area of endeavor, or to become
expert or more qualified in one in which the payor already has some training.
The principal benefit may consist of an opportunity to obtain a greater volume
of work and to realize a greater income than the payor would be able to
achieve without the aid of the payee and the business which the payee can
attract.40 In such cases there may also be a vague expectation, or an informal
understanding or even a formal agreement, that the payor will be the heir to
the practice on the retirement of the payee or at his earlier death, but the
effect on good will of any such arrangement is, as has been observed, prospec-
tive rather than present. If there is some degree of client favor acquired by
the payor in the interim, it is usually nebulous and of uncertain duration, and
as a practical matter is likely to become definite and important only when
the payee is removed as a counteracting force.
In seeking assurance that these advantages will be made available, the payor
may insist on the imposition of an express contractual obligation on the payee
to contribute his good will to the joint practice. Such a commitment may re-
strict the rights of the contributor and subject him to a monetary penalty on
its breach, but does not of itself establish a good will severance. In one case,
41
as an example, two persons formed a food brokerage partnership, one of them
having been in that business for thirty-five years and having built up good will
of substantial value. He agreed to contribute that good will to the partnership,
without entering into a covenant not to compete, and in return $5,000 was
paid to him by the other party. After six months the partnership was dis-
solved by mutual agreement, and the good will contributor then carried on
the business himself, apparently utilizing his old contacts. In an action for a
partnership accounting brought against him by his erstwhile partner, it was
held that he was under a duty to account and pay for the partnership good
will, which included good will initially contributed by him.42 Applying to this
case the standards developed heretofore to test a severance of good will, none
appears to have occurred at the time the $5,000 payment was made.43 Despite
40. See Payment For Partnership Goodwill, 227 THE LAw TIMEs 145 (1959) ; Rees
v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 925 (D. Ore. 1960), aff'd per curiant, 295 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1961).
41. Whitman v. Jones, 322 Mass. 340, 77 N.E.2d 315 (1948).
42. In valuing the appropriated good will, the court relied on the rules declared by
it in Hutchins v. Page, 204 Mass. 284, 290, 90 N.E. 565, 567 (1910), in which that value
was "estimated as it would have been, if disposed of at a judicial sale, that is, at its value,
with the right of the plaintiff to set up a competing business among the customers of the
firm and others." Whitman v. Jones, 322 Mass. 340, 344, 77 N.E.2d 315, 317-18 (194,).
43. In considering alternative approaches to the issue in the case, it is germane in this
connection that the court was willing to "lay to one side the contention of the plaintiff
that the $5,000 paid- to the defendant at the time the partnership was formed was payment
for a one-half interest in, the good will which the defendant had built up in the business
previously conducted by him individually. It is just as reasonable to infer that this sum
was paid by the plaintiff for the privilege of entering into a partnership with one who had
had greater experience in this type of business." Whitman v. Jones, 322 Mass. 340, 343,
77 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1948).
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the penalty imposed in the form of damages, the party contributing the good
will retained control of his clients and was able to retain their business to the
exclusion of his partner, and he apparently continued to enjoy their patronage
unmolested after paying the monetary penalty. 44 These circumstances scarcely
spell a severance of his good will.
5. Transitional Arrangements
In the case of a total, immediate sale of good will, the parties may agree on
a transition period during which the transferor will remain in association with
the transferee, in order to induce clients to continue their patronage and be-
come accustomed to the shift in practitioners. A relationship of this type is
different from the participation of a transferor which accompanies a partial
disposition of a professional interest. An association with a transferor for
transitional purposes commonly restricts the transferor to an inactive role, or
at least to a position without controlling or proprietorship authority over the
affairs of the practice. It is, furthermore, ordinarily of relatively short dura-
tion, 45 and certainly does not extend for a period of proprietorship as long as
ten years. Whether a particular prescribed period supports or contradicts a
present sale of good will is a question of fact. A long period of active par-
ticipation as a proprietor only means that, at its beginning, the practitioner is
not ready to retire.46 In the interim, for a substantial period, such a practitioner
has the same enjoyment and retains the same client ties, with the same oppor-
tunity to influence the allegiance of his clients, as the one who makes a partial
disposition without a definite commitment as to his future retirement. These
earmarks are absent from, and distinguish, a present total disposition facili-
tated by a transitional participation.
Similarly, the method of payment for the good will, as for other assets of
the practice sold in a total immediate disposition, may be in installments, and
during the period of payout the seller may retain some actual or conditional
affiliation with the practice in order to secure the buyer's obligations. Here
44. Injunctive relief, preventing the senior practitioner from resorting to his old
clients, would not seem to be practical in view of the relations with them which he
properly retains in such situations. Cf. McCurry v. Gibson, 108 Ala. 451, 457-59, 18 So.
806, 808 (1895) ; Dills v. Doebler, 62 Conn. 366, 26 Atl. 398 (1892). He may expressly
agree that, upon the termination of the partnership or his withdrawal from it, he will not
do business with those clients. Usually, however, as has been noted in the previous dis-
cussion, no such restriction is undertaken, by a senior participant. Cf. Malcolm J. Watson,
35 T.C. 203 (1960).
45. Umstead v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 88,316 (M.D. N.C. 1963), aff'd
per curiam, 327 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1964) (5 years); Charles F. Phillips, 40 T.C. 157
(1963) (3 years); Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962) (1 year); Herbert M. La
Rue, 37 T.C. 39 (1961) (1 to 2 years) ; Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950) (3 years).
In Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961), the pay-out was over 20 years, but the seller
withdrew at the beginning of this period and did not continue in, the practice.
46. Cf. Malcolm J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203 (1960), in which the finding of fact was
made that one of the significant motives in making such a partial disposition was the
purpose "to service adequately his expanding practice, the choice facing the petitioner
being to take in partners or to restrict his practice." Id. at 204.
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continued participation arises at the seller's insistence rather than that of the
buyer. The considerations in identifying a good will disposition are neverthe-
less the same. A genuine installment sale is usually spread over a relatively
short period, the seller desiring to limit the time during which he leaves at the
buyer's risk the consideration which he is to receive.47 Where the payout is of
longer duration, the seller is not likely to remain as a proprietor during the
entire extensive period of payout. Where the seller continues as an active
proprietor for a period as long as ten years, the presence of installment pay-
ments is likely to be camouflage for a partial disposition in which a severance
of good will occurs only at the end of that period.
6. Recapitulation
A determination of the merits of a claim of disposition of professional good
will requires a factual analysis, and for that purpose the following nontax
standards are illuminating:
(1) Professional good will is the desire on the part of a client to seek the
services of a particular practitioner.
(2) Professional good will may be a disposable asset. Whether or not it
actually is transferable in a particular case is a question of fact, not to be
determined by any abstract proposition about the transferable nature of good
will.
(3) The important standard in determining the existence of disposable
professional good will is whether in the specific case the good will has a sig-
nificant possibility of transfer, and not whether that possibility was consum-
mated with appreciable success. It is the opportunity which initially is relevant,
and not any particular degree of success in its consummation as to which
the purchasing practitioner can only speculate regardless of the scope of his
hopes. The actual outcome may have a bearing retrospectively, however, as evi-
dence on the prospects at the outset of shifting the good will.
(4) The presence of potentially disposable good will is itself without sig-
nificance unless it is also the subject of an actual disposition, and that dis-
position should be of sufficient substance to be identifiable as a severance. As
a general rule, based on the factual consequences in most instances, there can
be no such disposition unless the transferor is restricted through an express
or implied covenant not to compete. That restriction must be of a scope appro-
priate to the interest in good will purportedly transferred.
(5) By conforming to the foregoing standards there can be made an im-
mediate transfer of the total professional good will of a practitioner in a way
which can be identified as a severance and ought to be recognized as a dis-
position. A similar result is possible with respect to an immediate disposition
of a definitive portion of a practice and its good will.
(6) It is not possible to satisfy the foregoing standards by making an
alleged partial disposition of professional good will, after which the asserted
transferor remains for a substantial period in a position materially to control
47. Cf. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F,2d 322 (Sth Cir. 1956) (5 years).
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or enjoy the patronage purportedly divested. Such a transaction is not identi-
fiable as a severance, and ought not, therefore, be recognized as a good will
disposition.
(7) Where there has been such a deferred disposition, the event of disposi-
tion occurs, if at all, only later, when there occurs an immediate severance
either of all or of a definitive part of the good will in accordance with the fore-
going standards.
THE TAX TREATMENT
While determinations as to the presence or absence of professional good will
and its disposition in a specific case can be made by an application of these
nontax standards, such determinations do not by themselves dictate the proper
income tax treatment which ought to be conferred. They must be evaluated
in the context of accepted tax principles and techniques. After restating these
criteria of income taxation, they can be applied to the significant characteris-
tics revealed by the nontax standards, and the consequences can then be com-
pared with the results reached by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts.
1. The Tax Standards
The pertinent tax standards are derived principally from the area of capital
gains taxation. Two other spheres of recognized rules are also important,
however. One concerns the effect given to certain assignments which purport
to shift the ownership of income, and the other involves the weight accorded
to control and enjoyment as factors in determining the incidence of income tax.
No very logical or consistent line differentiates ordinary income from capi-
tal gain.4 8 The statutory provisions are a welter of confusion, concession, and
incertitude,49 and experts and theoreticians have been unable to find sufficient
common ground to formulate a broadly acceptable concept of a capital gain
and a method for its taxation. 0 In the face of so formidable a task, the attempt
will not be made here to rationalize capital gains taxation. Rather, generally
48. See generally Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in
Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REv. 745 (1955);
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get En-
acted, 70 H~av. L. REv. 1145 (1957).
49. In some cases, capital gains treatment has been accorded as a convenient way of
providing relief to certain types of income regarded, for one reason or another, as
incapable of bearing the full burden of ordinary income taxation. In others, capital
gains treatment has been, provided in lieu of an explicit averaging device. In still
other cases, the capital gains option has been made available as an. incentive device.
As a result, the differential tax treatment accorded capital gains has been extended
to certain types of income representing compensation for personal services, to in-
come arising from sales of assets representing the taxpayer's stock in trade, and
to amounts representing the accelerated receipt of future income.
JOINT EcoNoMc COMMITTEE, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM:
FACTS AND PRoBz.EMS 50 (1961).
50. See SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
ch. 4 (1951) ; Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARv. L. REV.
985 (1956); THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEMS FACTS AND PROBLEIS, supra, note 44 at
64-70; Lutz, Taxing Capital Gains, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1963, p. 16, col. 4.
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acknowledged principles and rules will be accepted, and the inquiry will in-
stead be directed to how a purported disposition of professional good will
ought to fit into the existing body of law.
For this purpose, the following established tax standards should be taken
into account:
a. The favored treatment of capital gains is an exception in the tax law,"'
which is to be "narrowly construed so as to protect the revenue against artful
devices." -5 2 The courts have stressed that a capital gain results from an appre-
ciation in market value 5 rather than the realization of a lump sum which
otherwise in time would be derived in a form taxable as ordinary income.54
b. A capital gain can be obtained only from the disposition of a "capital
asset,"55 which, under the statute, must be "property"' 6 and the meaning of
which, the Supreme Court has said, is to be narrowly construed. 7
c. A disposition can give rise to a capital gain only if it is a "sale or ex-
change."58 It is not entitled to recognition as such a disposition unless and
until it works a real change in ownership,5 9 and retention of a right of use may
prevent recognition as a sale.60
d. Income derived from the affirmative rendition of personal services is
51. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1956).
52. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958). Cf. Braunstein v.
Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 65 (1963) ; Donald B. Jones,
40 T.C. 249 (1963); James A. Wiltsie, 32 P.H Tax Ct. Mem. 1547 (1963).
53. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Trans. Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960) ; Commis-
sioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) ; First Nat'1 Bank v. Commissioner,
309 F.2d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 1962). Cf. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 93-105
(1961).
54. In addition to the Lake (assignment of an oil payment out of a working interest),
Gillette Motor (award for appropriation of use of facilities for limited period), and First
National (assignment of an anuity prior to maturity) cases, mpra note 53, see Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941) (payment received in cancellation of lease rental).
See also Roff v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1962) (annuity assignment);
Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1961) (original issue discount on maturity
of investment contract) ; Commissioner v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960) (sale of
endowment policy); Commissioner v. Morgan, 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959) (original
issue discount on maturity of investment contract) ; Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513
(6th Cir. 1954) (sales price of obligation attributable to defaulted interest); Rhodes'
Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942) (sale of dividend rights); Arnfeld
v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959)
(annuity assignment).
55. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222.
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221. A right to receive ordinary income is not "prop-
erty" for this purpose. See note 49 supra.
57. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1956).
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222.
59. Cf. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) ; Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co.,
281 U.S. 11 (1930); Albert E. Dyke, 6 T.C. 1134 (1946); M. Greenspun, 3 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 341 (1944), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub norn. Com-
missioner v. Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946).
60. Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Cf. Du Pont
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 623 (1941).
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compensation taxable as ordinary income,"' as is income received for the ab-
stention from personal effort, such as in the case of consideration received for
a covenant not to compete.0 2
e. A disposition of a right to render services or to receive compensation
for services rendered does not result in capital gain but is rather a conversion
of future ordinary income into present ordinary income. 3 Personal services
are not "property, 6 4 and the disposition of such rights frequently is open to
question as a sale or exchange. 65
f. Personal effort may create a product, tangible or intangible, which is
recognized as a capital asset and the disposition of which is accorded capital
gain treatment. 0 Particularly with respect to intangible assets, it may be diffi-
cult to distinguish a payment for the asset from one for the services creating
the asset.67
g. Where a transaction involves both a disposition of a capital asset and a
payment in the nature of compensation, the two will be treated separately and
the payment relating to each will be taxed accordingly ;0s but where the con-
sideration relating to each element is not ascertainable and therefore not sep-
arable, and where the compensation feature predominates, the entire trans-
action will result in ordinary income., 9
h. Good will is considered to be a capital asset, the sale of which at a profit
61. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (1) ; Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960); Ansorge v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1945); Frank Hodus, 14 T.C.
1301 (1950).
62. Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959); Beals' Estate v. Com-
missioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Copeland v. Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 58-193
(N.D.N.Y. 1957); Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1955); Victor H. Heyn,
39 T.C. 719 (1963); Max Levine, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 410 (1962).
63. United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Eidson,
310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962); Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962);
Gordon v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1958), affirming 29 T.C. 510 (1957);
Roscoe v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1954); Maryland Coal & Coke Co. v.
McGinnes, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f1 9262 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Glenn E. Alexander, 34 T.C.
758 (1960); Irving R. Lewis, 19 T.C. 887 (1953). But cf. Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v.
Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
64. Apart from judicial interpretation (see note 49 and 51 supra), this conclusion
may be required by the statutory exclusion in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(4).
65. See United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Holt v. Commissioner,
303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 301 F.2d
654 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953). Contra:
Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
66. The Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989 (1962); Calley and Clark Co. v. United States, 63-2
U.S. Tax Cas. ff 90,031 (S.D.W.Va. 1963); Dunn, The Transfer of Know-How to Con-
trolled Corporations, 39 TAxEs 571 (1961).
67. Cf. Walker v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 83,930 (W.D. Pa. 1961) Harold
L. Regenstein, 35 T.C. 183 (1960) ; Arthur C. Cope, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 525 (1953) ;
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964 INu. REv. BULL. No. 13 at 11; Rev. Rul. 59-325, 1959-2 Cum. BULL.
185.
68. Spence v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 556 (Ct. Cl. 1957) ; Arthur C. Ruge, 26
T.C. 138 (1956) ; Milton A. Bissell, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1034 (1959).
69. See Harry L. Bialock, 35 T.C. 649, 662 (1961); Green v. Allen, 67 F. Supp.
1004, 1006 (M.D. Ga. 1946). Cf. Walker v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f[ 83,930
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results in capital gain, 70 even though the value of good will depends on antici-
pated earnings.71
i. Where a taxpayer is entitled to receive compensation for services at a
future date and makes a gift of it by an anticipatory assignment, he realizes
the income and is taxable on it as much as if he had collected the income and
paid it over to the object of his bounty.72
j. A transferor remains taxable on the income from property despite a shift
in its technical ownership, if the transferor in effect retains control or dominion
over the property or the income from the property.
73
k. A transferor who retains the benefit or enjoyment of property will be
treated as the owner of the property for tax purposes despite a disposition of
title ownership.7 4
2. Effect of Covenant Not to Compete
Under these tax standards,7 53 payment for a covenant not to compete results
in ordinary income, as compensation in return for an abstention from personal
effort. In no event can the tax standards for capital gain treatment 76 be satis-
fied with respect to such a payment, even though the payment may represent
a capital expenditure for the payor.7 7 In view of the pivotal position which a
(W.D. Pa. 1961); Estate of Paul L. Mitchell, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1168 (1959);
Raymond M. Hessert, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1190 (1947).
An undivided amount was allocated by the court between good will and a covenant
not to compete in Umstead v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 88316 (M.D.N.C. 1963),
aff'd per curiam, 327 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1964); Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F2d 298
(3d Cir. 1963). See Note, Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete: A Problem of
Purchase Price Allocation, 67 YALE L.J. 1261 (1958).
70. Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 Cuai. BULL. 370; McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal
Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REv. 645 (1959) ; Note, 53 CoLual. L. Rav. 660 (1953). See Big
Four Industries, Inc., 40 T.C. 1055 (1963).
71. Illustrating the close correspondence between good will and earnings, see Haberle
Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1929), rev'd, 280 U.S. 384
(1930) ; Donal A. Carty, 38 T.C. 46 (1962) ; Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962) ;
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 237, 241; Stern, Planning Continuation of Account-
ant's Practice, 100 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 20 (1961) ; Nice, The Professional Life Under-
writer and Goodwill, 16 JOURN. Soc. CHARTERED Lirz UNDERWRITERS 66 (1962); Hearn,
Insurance Agencies - Income Tax Consequences Upon Termination of Agency Business,
40 TAxEs 655 (1962).
72. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940);
cf. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280
(1946). But cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) ; Paul A. Teschner, 38 T.C.
1003 (1962).
73. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d
398 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Stanton v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1951).
74. Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1962).
75. See note 62 supra.
76. See notes 51 through 59 supra.
77. Schill v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Wash. 1962); Balls v. United
States, 139 F. Supp. 930 (Ct. Cl. 1956) ; C. E. Silling, Sr., 27 T.C. 701 (1957). Disallow-
ing depreciation on a purchased professional interest, see Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1962) ; John Sumers, 36 T.C. 467 (1961) ; cf. Savings Assurance Agency,
Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1963).
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covenant not to compete or some qualifying equivalent occupies in the transfer
of professional good will, the conclusion would seem to be inescapable that the
profitable disposition of such good will involves a realization of ordinary in-
come by the transferor.
Yet doubt has been cast on this simple thesis by the tax treatment and the
accompanying semantics which the courts have evolved with respect to a cove-
nant not to compete undertaken in connection with a disposition of a business
and its good will. In such a situation the consideration paid for the covenant
has been deemed conventionally to be a capital receipt if the covenant has been
found to be "ancillary" to the transfer of the good will of the business, where-
as ordinary income is the result if the covenant has been found to be "sever-
able" from the good will.7 8 The same rules have been carried over, mechanical-
ly and without critical scrutiny, to the sale of a professional practice and its
good will.7
9
But this treatment, where the covenant is deemed to be "ancillary" in char-
acter, ignores the vital element of personal service underlying the covenant
even where it applies to a mercantile or commercial establishment, in which
the factor of personal service tends to be less prominent than in a professional
practice. These rules are therefore a patent departure from settled tax stand-
ards governing the tax treatment of compensation. This abnormality is justi-
fied on the ground that the "ancillary" covenant is inseparably bound up with
the good will and with the aggregate of assets transferred by the seller, and
is an indispensable incident for the effective transfer of those assets. There-
fore, the tax coloration of the covenant is determined as though it were an
indistinguishable part of good will.80 It is nevertheless the fact in most of these
cases in which the parties deem it desirable to include a covenant as part of
their bargain, that something significant has been paid for the covenant; there-
fore, regardless of any possible difficulties in valuation, the tax standards
should be respected by at least requiring an allocation of the portion of the
consideration attributable to the covenant.8 ' A more basic objection, how-
ever, is the false nature of the distinction drawn by these rules, for, as a
78. Edward A. Kermey, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962); Barnet, Covenants Not To Compete:
Their Effects Upon the Covenantor and Covenantee, N.Y.U. 18TH Ixsr. o FED. TAX.
861 (1960).
79. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Malcolm
J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203 (1960); Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950); Rodney B.
Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
80, Commissioner v. Gazette Telegraph Co., 209 F,2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) (dictum);
Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949); Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943); cf.
Howard G. Mathews, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1565 (1961) (dictum), aff'd per curiam,
311 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1963).
81. Cf. Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir. 1946) (L. Hand, J.):
"The one sure way to do injustice in such cases is to allow nothing whatever upon the
excuse that we cannot tell how much to allow." See Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079,
1086-87 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
An allocation was made in Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963)
(fuel oil distributor) ; Umstead v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 88,316 (D.C.N.C.
1963).
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matter of economic reality, the covenant must always be "ancillary" and can
never be "severable." To the extent that the assets of a business retain their
earning power because the seller does not assume a competing position the
covenant is "ancillary" to a transfer of the assets and the business good will;
and, since the only value of such a covenant is to preserve that earning power,
the covenant can be other than "ancillary" only in the rare case in which it has
no purpose in substance.8 2 This fundamental fact cannot be altered by the man-
ner of bargaining between buyer and seller, or the formal structure of their
agreement, or the expressions of intent which they manifest. The result, if
these rules were applied with economic candor in frank recognition of the
uniform "ancillary" character of the covenant, would be to confer capital gains
treatment in every case of a covenant given with the sale of a business.
Consequently, not only is a choice of alternatives in the traditional formu-
lation irrational, but the resulting treatment indicated by following that formu-
lation to its logical conclusion conflicts with settled tax standards relating to
income from personal service. There is beginning to appear in the courts,
moreover, some dissatisfaction with these traditional rules. But the effort so
far has been confined to an attempt to reinterpret the conventional formulation
while continuing to work within its limitations,"3 rather than recognizing its
underlying invalidity and scrapping it completely in favor of an approach
founded on basic tax principles.
As much as these conventional rules are at odds with reality where an in-
dustrial or commercial enterprise is involved, they are even less defensible with
respect to a professional practice. In the former there are identifiable tangible
or intangible assets in which the business good will is embodied, with respect
to which it may be argued that the covenant is incidental or "ancillary.
" 84
82. 3B MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 150 (Zimet & Weiss rev. ed.
1957), followed in Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961).
83. Departures have been indicated in the direction of determining whether the parties
intended to allocate a portion of the sales'price to the covenant, regardless of whether
their contract was arranged to make the covenant severable or whether the covenant was
treated in a "separate and distinct manner." Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner, 62-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 88, 316 (9th Cir. 1962), rehearing denied, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962);
Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d. 52 (9th Cir. 1961) (disregarding the formal severance
of the covenant and related consideration in, the written agreement of sale and treating the
covenant as part of the good will sold) ; United Finance and Thrift Corp. v. Commissioner,
282 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1960) (disregarding the specific allocation in the contract and
making a different apportionment, assigning part of the consideration to good will) ; Wil-
son Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955) (allocating
a portion of the consideration to the covenant where it had an actual value, even though
there was no segregation in the contract) ; Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F2d 298 (3d
Cir. 1963). But see Van Kirk v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87643 (D.C. Ore.
1963) ; Armstrong v. Erickson, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87690 (D.C. Ore. 1963).
84. Cf. The Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989 (1962). See also the observations of Judge Opper
concurring in Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128, 1135 (1961), with respect to accompanying
affirmative efforts to be made by a seller of professional good will. But see Estate of
Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956) ; and, as to services "merely
ancillary to the sale," Ernest B. White, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 81 (1963); Alfred Muer-
lin, 25 T.C. 118 (1955).
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By contrast, there typically are no such assets of significance in a professional
practice; instead, in accordance with the proposed analysis based on the non-
tax standards, the core element is itself the covenant not to compete or a
qualifying substitute. The point of emphasis in the sale of the industrial or
commercial business is on its assets; by contrast, the emphasis is reversed in
the sale of a professional practice, so that it falls on the personal commitment
of a covenant not to compete or an acceptable equivalent. The covenant not
to compete accompanying the sale of a professional practice more closely re-
sembles a covenant not to compete unconnected with a sale of business assets,
and under traditional rules ought clearly to result in ordinary income.
3. Effect of Code on Transfer of Good Will
Where a profession is practiced in partnership form and the interest of a
withdrawing partner is liquidated either on his retirement or death, there is a
statutory provision which grants capital assets status for good will of the part-
nership if "the partnership agreement provides for payment with respect to
good will."8 It may be asked whether the Internal Revenue Code as a con-
sequence makes the good will of a professional partnership a transferable com-
modity. Such a simple stipulation in a partnership agreement should not neces-
sarily compel the conclusion that good will actually has been transferred.
Rather, this statutory provision, like others in the Code,8s appears to apply
only on the assumption that a transfer has in fact occurred without foreclos-
ing an inquiry into the existence of that fact.8 7 The existence and transfer of
such good will as a factual matter should be ascertained not by the partner-
ship agreement but in accordance with the nontax standards which have been
described.
4. Immediate Total Disposition of Good Will
The simplest case of a purported disposition of professional good will, in
which an immediate disposition of all of it is attempted, raises two prime ques-
tions with a bearing on the tax consequences to the transferor.
First, in view of the factual dependence of such a disposition on a covenant
not to compete or an eligible substitute as disclosed by the nontax standards,
85. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 736(b) (2) (B); Wnias, op. cit. mipra note 3, § 26.06.
See Karan v. Commissioner, 319 F,2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Jackson Investment Co., 41
T.C. 675 (1964).
That a personal service partnership can have transferable good will is recognized in
Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b) (7), example (3). Under the 1939 Code, the sale of a partner-
ship interest was treated as the sale of a capital asset. Ayrton, Metal Co. v. Commissioner,
299 F2d 741 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Dorman v. United States, 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961);
John W. Lenney, 38 T.C. 287 (1962).
86. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§ 741, 751.
87. Cf. Chatsworth Stations, Inc., P-H 1964 Tax Ct. Mem. ff 64,011. Cf. S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 395 (1954): "Where the partnership agreement provides for
payments with respect to good will, uch payments may not exceed the reasonable value
of the partner's share of partnership good will." See V. Zay Smith, 37 T.C. 1033 (1962),
aff'd, 313 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1962); Carol F. Hall, 19 T.C. 445 (1952); A. Rhett du
Pont, 19 T.C. 377 (1952).
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the question arises whether the gain to the transferor can ever qualify as a
capital receipt. The answer ought to be, for the reasons given in the previous
discussion of the tax treatment of such a covenant, that as a general rule the
character of the transaction precludes capital gain treatment. If this stand
were adopted, there would be no need to press further the inquiry into the
tax consequences of professional good will dispositions. But there is no record
of such a position having been urged before the courts with a proper analytical
foundation,8" and both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have ac-
cepted capital gains treatment for the proceeds from the disposition of pro-
fessional good will as an, available alternative. 89
The extent to which the Code's recognition of capital gains treatment for
payments received for good will on the withdrawal from a partnership or on
sale of a partnership interest 9 0 forces this position upon the courts and the
Service is questionable. It apparently was the legislative assumption that these
provisions might apply to a professional partnership.0 ' There is no evidence,
however, that Congress considered or even was aware of the nature of the
transaction involved in a disposition of professional good will. The considera-
tion received for a covenant not to compete - which is indispensable to a
recognizable transfer of good will - properly ought not to be taxed as a capital
gain, and it is doubtful that Congress, if the matter were called to its atten-
tion, would agree to breach established tax principles and treat such personal
service income other than as ordinary income.92 A contrary interpretation not
only would carve out a special exception to established law but would do so
only in favor of partners, discriminating against identically situated individual
practitioners or those using one of the new corporate forms authorized in many
states.93 These are not consequences which are readily adaptable to a reasoned
interpretation of the intent of Congress.
Secondly, how is a distinction to be made between the situations which are
to qualify for capital gains treatment and those for which it should be denied,
in view of the pre-eminent role of the covenant not to compete or some equiv-
alent? Because the question must be postulated disregarding the proper recog-
nition to be given to the non-competition covenant, a rational answer seems
inherently impossible. This difficulty is reflected in part in the confusion and
artifice found in the previously discussed tax rules developed by the courts in
88. Cf. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1956);
Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251, 1259 (1950).
89. Total immediate dispositions were involved in the Masquelette and Wyler cases,
supra note 88, and in, the-Horton case, 13 T.C; 143 (1949).
90. See notes 85 and 86 supra.
91. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 96-98, 403 (1954), using a personal
service partnership to illustrate the application of these provisions.
92. Compare INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, §§ 671-78, prescribing exclusive statutory rules
as to when a grantor is taxable on the income-from a trust, with Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c)
(!956), stating that a grantor may be taxed on trust income under the anticipatory as-
sigmnent rule.
93. See note 140 infra and accompanying text.
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dealing with the effect of a covenant not to compete.Y4 Nevertheless, for pur-
poses-of further inquiry the position of the courts, that the presence of a non-
competition covenant of itself does not bar capital gains treatment, may be
accepted, and this question, concerned with distinguishing between qualifying
and nonqualifying situations, can be recast as follows When, in the particular
circumstances, does a transaction occur which is entitled to capital gains
treatment as an effective disposition of professional good will?
This question has drawn a vacillating reaction from the Internal Revenue
Service. At first the Service took the position that for income tax purposes
professional good will was not a transferable asset, and conseqtuently that no
portion of the sales proceeds on disposition of a practice could be allocated to
good will, unless exclusive use of the individual or firm name were sold as
well.95 This position was strenuously criticized and challenged, and the courts
rejected it.96 In the light of the nontax law on professional good will as it has
been analyzed above, the courts were correct; the position was unsound. If
the income tax treatment were based on the view of those state courts which
deny the transferable nature of professional good will, there would be no such
asset to be transferred regardless of the accompanying disposition of a pro-
fessional name. Assuming that in such circumstances payment nonetheless is
made for the use of the name, it could have little value and not much of the
sales proceeds could be attributed to it - since it could be shorn, by hypothesis,
of the good -will which those courts hold to be nontransferable. Similarly,
where regulations of a professional association bar the outright sale of a name
or prohibit a payment for good will,97 the transfer of a name clearly could not
itself be the basis on which to predicate a payment allegedly made for good
will. 98 Taking the other approach, under which the income tax law would be
based on the view that professional good will is a vendible asset, there would
likewise be no warrant for making the transfer of a name an indispensable
condition to the transfer of good will, the local courts of that persuasion not
having imposed such a condition for a good will transfer. Indeed, if any one
factor is to be required to establish a transfer of good will, it is not the pro-
fessional name but the obligation, or one of the equivalents suggested earlier,
to refrain from competing for the clients for whose favor payment is made.99
94. See notes 78, 79, and 80 supra.
95. Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 47.
96. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956), reversing
14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 879 (1955); Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950); Rodney
B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949); Ernest B. White, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 70 (1963).
97. Seq note 9 supra.
98. But cf. Savings Assurance Agency, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1963), in
which good will was found not to have been transferred because of the prior death of a
sole proprietor and the cessation of active conduct of an, insurance agency. A transfer of
a name here might serve as the basis for a transfer of good will. Alfred Muerlin, 25
T.C. 118 (1955).
99. See the agreement made for the sale of an accountant's good will in Estate of
Leo Mehik, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 67 (1961), aff'd sub nor. Karan v. Commissioner,
319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Hock, Personal Good Will, 37 TAXES 825, 836 (1959).
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The stand taken by the Service was therefore defective and vulnerable to
criticism. And yet the thrust of its view was not completely groundless, in
that it perceived that such good will could not be transferred - at least not to
an ascertainable extent meriting tax recognition - without the corroboration
and support of a proper concurrent arrrangement.
After being repulsed in the courts, the Service reluctantly 100 acknowledged
that in such cases there may be transferable good will in a professional practice
and that it may be conveyed without an assignment of a name, but added
enigmatically that this result could obtain only where the success of the prac-
tice was not dependent solely on the personal characteristics and competence
of the owner.' 10 Since such personal factors commonly determine the experi-
ence of a professional practice, it is difficult to understand when transferable
good will would ever exist within this limitation. In some situations clients
may be attracted to an office or organization with little regard for the in-
dividuals with whom they deal,10 2 and success in such instances may be con-
sidered not to depend solely on the practitioner. But these represent a small
minority of the cases in which the question of transferable professional good
will is pertinent. Of course, the professional practitioner often has employees
or assistants, and in a literal sense it can be said that his success is not de-
pendent solely on himself. Such a standard would make little sense, however,
and would appear not to be the guide which the Service intended. Under a
third interpretation of the Service directive, a practice would be deemed not
to depend solely on the person of the owner where another practitioner -
another person - could carry on the practice as well and creditably discharge
its professional requirements. 0 3 The meaning of such a test, however, is not
clear and, if it were the guide, would need refinement. It is usually possible
to find a practitioner of ability and talent equal to that of the owner of
the practice and who could service the clients as well as the owner, and
cast in these terms, the standard could uniformly be satisfied and would there-
fore lose its practical importance. Such a test might prove more useful if it
were put in terms of an inquiry into the probability that the old clients will
patronize a replacement of equal ability, rather than assuming such a con-
tinuity in patronage. An affirmative answer would indicate that the successor
could carry on the old practice in the sense that the practice would remain
with him. In that sense the success of the practice would not depend on the
personal characteristics of the predecessor, for, even assuming a close depend-
ence on the predecessor, he might nevertheless be able to take steps reason-
ably calculated to shift a significant part of his clientele to the successor.l(M If
100. See 1959-2 Cum. Buu.. 7, for the Commissioner's acquiescence in Rodney B.
Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949); and Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950).
101. Rev. Rul. 60-301, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 15.
102. See, e.g., Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Merle P. Brooks,
36 T.C. 1128 (1961) ; John, Sumers, 36 T.C. 467 (1961).
103. Cf. Hoc, LR.B. and Recent Cases Recognize that Good Will of a Professional
is Salable, 14 TAXATIoN 34, 34-35 (1961).
104. See note 16 supra.
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the meaning of the present Service position is reduced to these terms, the
existence of a sufficient probability of client transfer or the presence of ade-
quate steps to accomplish such a transfer ought to return to the central ele-
ments which have been described previously in this analysis.
No opinion has yet been expressed by the courts about the new Service
position. 105 Apart from the matter of the transfer of the practitioner's name,
there has been little perceptive analysis by the courts in tax cases of facts
which may show whether a disposition of professional good will has occurred.
Where capital gain treatment has been sustained, however, a covenant not to
compete has been present in the parties' arrangement. 0 6 Moreover, an ad-
ministrative standard such as that now maintained by the Service and inter-
preted as last suggested, to require effective steps reasonably calculated to
shift the transferred good will, would be consistent with those decisions.
The Service position should be clarified in a comprehensive directive deal-
ing with professional good will, dispensing with the need for speculative in-
terpretation, and reflecting the nontax standards propounded previously. The
courts in turn ought to accept and articulate those standards. To do so would
not onlv introduce the proper approach in this area but might also lead to a
recognition of the determinative weight of the noncompetition arrangements,
causing a reexamination and reformulation by the courts of the present tax
treatment of a sale of professional good will.
5. Partial Disposition of Good Will by Continuing Participant
If the present rules are accepted, a total immediate disposition of profes-
sional good will can thus result in capital gain to the transferor. This result
is postulated on the presence of an effective disposition, which the nontax
standards show to be possible where there is a total immediate disposition.
But those nontax standards have also been shown to reveal, with respect to
a partial disposition, that: (a) In the case of a partial disposition which is
essentially similar to a total disposition, as where an entire separate unit of
practice is sold, the same conclusion applies that an effective disposition can
he made. (b) Where there is a purported partial disposition of good will and
the seller continues in the practice without a commitment for the disposition
of the balance of the good will and his withdrawal at some fixed time, there
has been no effective disposition until the actual withdrawal and completion
of the disposition. (c) The factual characteristics of an alleged partial disposi-
tion with continuing participation by the purported transferor include: his
uninterrupted control over the good will involved in the disposition; his un-
broken enjoyment of the good will; the absence of a definitive, ascertainable
severance of good will; the absence of a covenant not to compete or some
equivalent arrangement which operates during the period of participation; and
the rendition of personal services by him during that period for the benefit of
105. Rev. Rul. 60-301, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 15, was discussed briefly and superficially
in Malcolm J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203, 209-10 (1960), and was mentioned in Ernest B.
White, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 70 (1963).
106. See, e.g., cases at note 96 supra.
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the party from whom he receives the consideration. Such an arrangement -
if more than an insignificant or formal share in the practice is retained -
manifests a desire and intent to continue actively in the practice.
The fact complex which characterizes such a transaction does not meet the
usual tax standards for capital gain treatment. To the extent that the con-
sideration is received for present or future personal services, the payment is
not made for a capital asset, and cannot result in capital gain. The outcome is
the same insofar as the payment is for an assignment of future ordinary in-
come; there is only a conversion into present ordinary income. To the extent
that the consideration may also include payment for a capital asset, the con-
sideration allocable to such payment must be ascertainable and separately deter-
minable. In fact it is not. Even if the portion allocable to the capital asset "good
will" could be isolated, there is no disposition which rises to the status of a
"sale or exchange" so long as substantial ties to the allegedly transferred asset
are retained by the continuing participant. Indeed, the enjoyment and control
remaining in the purported transferor indicate that no dispositiop entitled to
recognition for tax purposes has occurred at the time of the formal partial
disposition, and that in substance the continuing participant should be con-
sidered to continue his ownership of the good will. ° 7
In harmony with basic tax principles, a payment received in these circum-
stances ought to be treated as ordinary income rather than capital gain. That
conclusion is supported by O'Rear v. Commissioner,0 8 in which a lawyer, as
a single practitioner, brought in two equal partners, each of whom paid him
$25,000 for his "excess value of good will and unearned fees." His continuation
in the practice was essential to the arrangement; a covenant not to compete
was not involved. He claimed that he had sold a capital asset, consisting of
good will and the right to share in future profits, and reported none of these
proceeds on the ground that they did not exceed the value of the asset on
March 1, 1913. The Commissioner taxed the entire proceeds as ordinary in-
come, contending that in reality they "represented the then present value of a
two-thirds interest in the petitioner's expected future profits from his profes-
sion." ' 1 9 In a perceptive opinion, itself affirmed on appeal, the Board of Tax
Appeals sustained the Commissioner. Relying on the wording of the agreement
between the parties, it found that a sale had not occurred because the payment
was made only as a "differential" to compensate the senior man for the loss of
a share of future profits to his less experienced and younger partners.
Because the language of the agreement in O'Rear was phrased in terms of
"differential payment" rather than of a "sale," the remaining observations of
both tribunals might be considered mere dictum. Yet those observations, par-
ticularly by the Board, apply to fundamental characteristics of the transaction,
transcending the particular form of the O'Rear agreement. Thus the decision
107. See cases at note 73 supra; cf. State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d
635 (Ist Cir. 1959).
108. 80 F2d 473 (6th Cir. 1935), affirming 28 B.T.A. 698 (1933).
109. 80 F.2d at 474.
1184 [Vol. 73 : 1158
TAX TREATMENT OF GOOD WILL
should be taken as founded on the following factual characteristics to which
attention was called: (a) There was no disposition of good will. First, it was
doubted whether professional good will could be transferred unless the trans-
feror refrained from practicing; and, second, the good will could not be trans-
ferred "piecemeal" to two others.11-0 The appellate court felt that in no event
was the good will of a lawyer transferable,"' but that position was more ex-
treme than was necessary for the decision of the case. (b) Compensation for
personal services was received "through an arrangement with partners whereby
they advance certain amounts for the privilege of taking a larger share of the
partnership profits than their personal contribution would otherwise justify."" 2
While the O'Rear case confirms the analysis proposed in this article, a more
recent decision is diametrically opposed. In Rees v. United States,'" a well
established orthodontist joined with two younger men to form a partnership
in which each of them was to have an equal share. They agreed on a price of
$35,000 for an undefined interest in the good will of his practice, to be paid to
him in equal monthly installments over a 10 year period. The parties arrived
at this amount after considering the reputation of the senior man, his capacity
to attract future business, and the earnings of his practice. The district court
held this to be capital gain received on a sale of good will, and on appeal the
decision was affirmed in reliance on the opinion of the lower court. The O'Rear
decision was distinguished by the district court on the ground that the state-
ments made there about the sale of good will were dicta, and the weight of
that case was discounted on the basis of its age, having been decided before a
more recent group of cases." 4 But those cases involved a total rather than a
partial disposition of good will, and therefore neither furnished precedent for
the court in Rees, nor represented a development which made O'Rear obsolete.
The latter and its observations were directly in point and should not have
been dismissed summarily. On the question which really was in issue, the dis-
position of only part of the good will, the court simply said that the failure to
sell the entire good will was of no significance. Analytically, therefore, the
court was mistaken both in its result and in its reasoning.
The Service has ruled that it will not follow the Rees decision, indicating
only that it conflicts with the O'Rear case and the established principle that
an assignment of future earnings results in ordinary income." 5 Earlier, while
the Service still emphasized the professional name as the vehicle for trans-
ferring the good will," 0 it had declared that consideration would not be treated
as received for the sale of good will where it was paid for a part interest in
the practice and the right to use the transferor's name, if the transferor con-
110. 28 B.T.A. at 700-01.
111. 80 F.2d at 474.
112. 28 B.T.A. at 701.
113. 187 F. Supp. 924 (D. Ore. 1960), affd per curiam, 295 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1961).
114. Cases cited at note 96 supra.
115. Rev. Rul. 62-114, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 15, based on T.I.R. 388 (June 29, 1962),
reflecting Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 47.
116. See note 95 supra.
19641 1185
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tinued in the practice." 7 Although properly hostile to the Rees case, these
fragmentary expressions are insufficient as an administrative guide; therefore,
a comprehensive directive should include a more extensive presentation of the
features of the partial disposition and the reasons why they make the Rees
case untenable.
Section 751 of the Code, discussed previously in connection with the total
disposition of good will," 8 confers capital gain treatment on the sale of "all
or a part" of a partnership interest, including its good will. But capital gain
treatment is no more appropriate here for what is essentially ordinary income
resulting from a purported partial transfer than it was there. A disposition
is first necessary 119 and is lacking in transactions of the kind involved in the
O'Rear and Rees cases. Section 751 therefore does not alter the conclusions
which have been reached.
6. Partial Disposition of Good Will by Retiring Participant
Rather than leave the transferor as a continuing participant with no fixed
obligation for retirement, the parties may arrange a specific or determinable
time at which the transferor will retire. Thus, a physician, at the time of the
purported partial disposition of his practice, may provide contractually for the
disposition of the balance of his good will and for his retirement ten years
later. Should such a binding obligation for withdrawal in the future cause the
payment made at the outset to be treated differently for tax purposes from
what has been suggested with respect to a partial disposition by a continuing
participant? If the observations which have been made with respect to the
customary case of a partial disposition in which no limit on the period of par-
ticipation by the "selling" practitioner is fixed are sound, then such an obliga-
tion to withdraw, with its execution fixed at some distant time in the future,
presents no essential difference in fact and calls for no distinction in tax treat-
ment. 2
0
The presence or absence of an obligation for distant retirement does not
alter the significant circumstances in the substantial intervening period. In
the meantime the alleged transferor retains the same control and enjoyment
of his original good will, and there is the same lack of an ascertainable sever-
ance of good will, as in the situation of the continuing participant uncommitted
to retirement. While such a retirement obligation ultimately may compel a
change in the transferor's relations to his clients, it does not do so in the many
intervening years, during which he can continue to influence and use that
patronage for his own profit.' 2 ' Such an arrangement is to be distinguished
on its face from the sale of the entire professional good will for a consideration
117. Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 47.
118. See text accompanying notes 85 and 86 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
120. This conclusion and the observations made here apply as well to arrangements
involving an obligation as to succession at a future time which is not definitely fixed but
which may occur on, the happening of an event, such as death or, retirement.
121. Cf. note 46 supra.
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paid in installments, during the payment of which the seller normally remains
in the practice for a relatively short period.122 Nor are these circumstances
modified by a covenant of the transferor not to compete for the patronage of
his clients, if the covenant does not begin to operate, as is likely to be the
case, until the future withdrawal date arrives. Here, as in the situation of the
purported transferor who continues in the practice without a retirement ob-
ligation, the nontax standards establish the fact of failure to make a disposi-
tion of good will at the beginning of the transaction, and payments received
at that time ought to be denied capital gain treatment.
The essential similarity of these situations is further underscored by the
ease with which, in most cases, the parties can shift from one form to the
other, without sacrificing any of the substance of their affairs. If capital gain
is denied to the party who does not undertake to retire, it would only invite
evasion and undermine that denial to confer different treatment because of a
provision for distant retirement. It is too often a simple matter to inject such
a provision without frustrating the intentions or modifying the practical posi-
tions of the parties to a partial disposition, and, if a tax advantage weighed
in the balance, it could be obtained conveniently through such a contractual
formality.12 3 It would create an inconsistency to confer capital gain in one
situation and not the other, and thereby would cause the adoption by indirec-
tion of the holding in the Rees case 124 as the prevailing rule for the situation
in which no arrangement is made to limit the duration of the continued par-
ticipation. The inconsistency can be eliminated, of course, and the opportunity
for such evasion removed, by an outright acceptance of the Rees case, but the
resulting uniformity would mean no more than open resignation to erosion of
tax principle on a broader scale.
The fixed-retirement situation was presented in Malcolm J. Watson.125
There, a certified public accountant, as a single practitioner, sold a 45 percent
share in his practice to two other accountants with whom he formed a partner-
ship, retained a substantial profits interest, and agreed to sell them the remain-
ing 55 percent ten years later. Payment for the 45 percent share was measured
in part by past earnings, and was to be made in part for an interest in the
future earnings of the partnership. The two buyers were juniors who had been
employed elsewhere and who did not appear to have clients of their own to
any significant extent. The Tax Court rejected a contention that this payment
was ordinary income from an assignment of a share in future earnings, and
instead held it to be capital gain on the sale of good will. In substance the Tax
122. See text accompanying notes 45 and 46 supra.
123. The opposition of interests between the contracting parties, sometimes relied on
as a safeguard to produce arrangements which are genuine in. substance and to minimize
revenue loss, is absent here. The use of such a formality to get capital gain for the
"transferor" does not cause an alteration in the tax position of the other party, whose
payment in any event is likely to be treated as a capital expenditure. See Savings Assur-
ance Agency, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1963).
124. See note 113 supra.
125. 35 T.C. 203 (1960). Cf. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Court treated the arrangement as a total disposition of the practice, with the
continued participation of the transferor as having no other major purpose
than to assure the continued patronage of his clients. This reconstructed ver-
sion by the Tax Court represented a reshaping of the facts into a mold sig-
nificantly different from the actual situation before it, ignoring the ten-year
period interposed before there could be a total disposition, overlooking the
control and enjoyment in the transferor during this long intervening period,
and exaggerating the extent to which the desire to transfer the good will was
a responsible cause for the interjection of that period of continued participa-
tion.
The holding in Malcolm J. Watson is supported by the Rees case, in which
the district court reached a compatible conclusion without going through the
gyrations of the Tax Court in Watson. On the surface, Watson might appear
to be an a fortiori decision, in that a finding of capital gain may seem more
difficult to make in the absence of an obligation to retire than in the presence
of such an undertaking. If capital gain is proper in Rees, it might seem un-
avoidable in Watson; and, conversely, it might appear that Rees may be re-
jected without reflection on the force of Watson. Indeed, although the Service
reacted sharply in renouncing the Rees result, an appeal filed from the Watson
decision was withdrawn and as yet there has been no formal indication from
the Service as to whether or not it acquiesces in it. In essence, however, the
facts in these two cases display the same fundamental characteristics - at
least up to a retirement date which is long deferred - and, for the considera-
tions heretofore discussed, it would be undesirable and inconsistent to attempt
to differentiate them. The rejection by the Service of the Rees decision should
therefore caution tax planners that resistance may be encountered in the other
area as well. The views of the Service on this subject should not be left to con-
jecture, however, and, as part of its comprehensive directive urged before, it
ought to express and clarify its position, demonstrate the similarity of Watson
and Rees, and find them equally unacceptable.
7. Deferred Total Disposition of Good Will
Where the formal arrangement between the parties consists of a deferred
disposition of all the good will to some distant or indeterminate future time
or occasion, rather than disposing of a part of it immediately or piecemeal in
the interim, there is by hypothesis a future date at which the transfer will take
place and when the transferor will sever completely his relations with his prac-
tice as a proprietor. If no payments are made until that event occurs in the
future, the transaction should become at that time an immediate total disposi-
tion and be treated accordingly.
If either at the inception of the arrangement or at some interim point pay-
ment is made to the transferor, the transaction ought to be treated in the same
fashion for tax purposes as a purported immediate or interim disposition of
part of the good will plus the deferral of the balance until a later time. In form
these transactions differ in that the latter, the partial disposition, produces the
facade of a simultaneous transfer of good will with the initial or interim pay-
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ments, whereas the other is silent or even expressly provides that no interest
in the good will is to pass until final payment is made. But in substance these
transactions have an underlying resemblance, of the type described in connec-
tion with the nontax standards and to which reference has been made in pre-
ceding discussion of the tax consequences. The tax treatment therefore ought
to be the same, the initial and interim payments being regarded as ordinary
income.
As a practical matter, no such arrangements, involving a long deferral of
the entire good will transfer, have been found,126 but they would appear soon
enough if the difference in form were dignified with a difference in tax in-
cidence. An arrangement for interim installment payments may be made as a
method of financing a genuine total disposition, conceived and intended as
such by the parties but involving some deferment in the transfer of technical
ownership of the practice as a security device pending completion of the pay-
ments. As has been indicated previously, 27 however, such a transaction would
be factually distinguishable from those considered here.
8. Total Disposition for a Share of Profits
A total immediate disposition of the good will of a practice may be made
for a consideration which is not only measured by the future profits of the
practice but in its very payment is made conditional on the presence of such
profits. The factual characteristics of such a transaction have been discussed,
and it was observed that under the nontax standards a disposition may be
viewed as being followed by a placement of the sales proceeds at the risk of
the practice in return for a share of the profits.'28
If the transaction is divided into two separable elements cbnsisting of these
two phases, capital gain treatment for the bulk of the consideration would be
required under present tax law. At least where a seller has divested himself
of his total interest in an asset, tax precedent recognizes that a sale can qualify
for capital gain treatment notwithstanding a consideration consisting of a
portion of the subsequent income from the asset.'129 Recently there has even
been congressional confirmation of this principle.130 Yet under an alternative
approach, the profit sharing feature of the arrangement would preclude its
division into two phases; both would be merged into a single transaction, for
which there would be no recognition of a disposition because of the continuing
126. Cf. Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961), in which there was a total immediate
disposition but the consideration was to be paid at the rate of $1,000 per month for 20
years. The seller, moreover, did not continue to act in the practice as a proprietor. The
Service has acquiesced in this decision. 1962-2 Cumi. BULL. 4.
127. See notes 45 and 46 supra; cf. Merle P. Brooks, supra note 126.
128. See discussion in text following note 30 supra; and Ernest B. White, 32 P-H
Tax Ct Mem. 81 (1963).
129. See the case law concerned with dispositions of copyrights and patents, discussed
in 3B MERTEws, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION §§ 22.132, 22.133 (Zimet & Weiss
rev. ed. 1958).
130. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1964), concerned with the addition
of § 483 to the 1954 Code by § 224 of the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 272, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 26, 1964).
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economic interest of the transferor in the asset transferred. Thus, in an older
case where a stock brokerage house contracted to attempt to transfer its cus-
tomers to a similar house for a consideration consisting of 25 percent of the
commissions to be received on securities sales to those customers during the
next six years, the transaction was found to be a profit sharing arrangement
productive of only ordinary income to the seller.131 The prevailing rules take
a contrary approach, however, accepting the divisible nature of the two phases
for tax purposes, and recognizing the presence of a good will disposition on
a capital gain basis.132
Such treatment ought to be accompanied, in view of the second phase, by
inclusion of a portion of the future payments as income representing an in-
vestment return. Before the 1964 Act, acceptance of the disposition as the
focal point of the transaction would have made possible avoidance of that
ordinary income through its conversion into capital gain. If the future pay-
ments were susceptible of reduction to present worth, the capital gain would
have been computed with reference to that present value, which, as a result of
a discount or interest factor, would be less than the face amount of the pay-
ment.133 The disposition would then have been treated as a closed transaction,
and subsequent realization of the difference between the present worth and the
face value would have been treated as a separate transaction resulting in or-
dinary income.13 But if the future payments were not reducible to present
131. Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1943). The contention, of a joint
venture with a split fee arrangement was rejected in Ernest B. White, 32 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 81 (1963).
132. The suggestion that such an agreement is really a profit sharing arrangement
rather than a sale and therefore not entitled to capital gain treatment reflects a broader
question. A sale of good will for a present single payment, usually determined on the basis
of anticipated earnings, in a sense also is an arrangement for a share of future earnings.
The single payment is little more than the present capitalized equivalent of the future
profits. Is the difference in payment - in one amount rather than in installments - or
is the difference in. accuracy of computation, - on the basis of actual earnings experience
rather than, through an advance guess - sufficient to warrant capital gain, treatment in
one case and. its denial in the other, where in both cases the seller has otherwise parted
with all interest in the asset in such manner that it has come completely under the control
of the buyer? This question is symptomatic of an even deeper dilemma: the problem of
determining what is a capital asset and of distinguishing between property which is no
more than future income reduced to present worth - and therefore not a capital asset -
and property which falls into the capital asset category. In the context of a bargain be-
tween parties at arms' length, all good will is an estimate of future income reduced to
present worth. Indeed, in a basic economic sense, the same may even be said of the worth
of tangible property beyond its scrap value.
133. Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 15.
134. Mark L. Grinsten, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 64.051 (Feb. 28, 1964).
The excess of face amount over present value can, be found to be ordinary income on
two grounds: (1) After being taxed on the sales proceeds at their present worth, the
proceeds acquire a tax basis in the amount of the present worth as an investment in the
practice. That investment may then be amortized over the life of the payments,
and the excess may be treated, as a return on, the investment. (2) The future payments are
income after recovery of basis, and, since there is no sale or exchange in the process of
receiving those payments, the excess cannot be capital gain.
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worth because of their contingent nature or the absence of a cash equivalent
for the obligation to make those payments, the transaction would not have
been considered closed at the time of sale and the payments would have been
treated entirely as capital gain received on the sale.13 5 This could well have
been the outcome where the payments depend on the uncertainties of profit in
a professional practice.13 Now, however, this opportunity for tax avoidance
is substantially curtailed as a result of a recently adopted statutory pro-
vision,137 and the prevention of such avoidance should no longer be a factor
in deciding how to treat such a transaction.
9. Professional Associations
With the objective of enabling professional practitioners to adopt a form
of organization which would qualify as a corporation for federal income tax
purposes,1 38 in order that they may enjoy the tax concessions tendered em-
ployee benefits,139 more than thirty states have enacted statutes during the
past three years which variously authorize the creation of professional asso-
ciations or corporations.140 The interaction between these new forms and the
element of good will suggests two questions, one concerned with the effect of
these forms on the tax treatment of good will disposition, and the other with
the effect of our analysis of professional good will on the recognition of these
forms as corporations.
The use of a corporate form as an organizational medium does not alter the
underlying personal and economic factors which characterize the practice of
a profession and the development of professional good will. The nature of the
relationship between the practitioner and his client, the characteristics of
which define the good will flowing from one to the other, is in no way affected
by the form of organization under state law.141 In determining the transfer-
able character of the good will of the practice and the conditions required to
135. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911
(2d Cir. 1948).
136. Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1943).
137. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 483, added by § 224 of the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 26, 1964).
138. For the requirements on which recognition of a corporation is conditioned see
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960) ; United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
139. The principal incentive is the possibility of adopting a qualified employees retire-
ment plan, the contributions to which are nontaxable to the employee but deductible by
the employer under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404. Cf. the Self-Employed Individuals
Tax Retirement Act of 1962, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
140. Many of these statutes are listed in Grayck, Professional Associations and the
Kiutner Regulations: Some Answers, More Questions, and Further Comments, 17 TAX
L. Rrv. 469 n.1 (1962). Since that time such statutes were also enacted by California,
Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Utah. For discussions of some of the problems in these statutes, see Bittker,
Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments,
17 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961); Alexander, Some Problens of a Professional Association,
13 W. REs. L. REv. 212 (1962) ; Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75
HARv. L. REv. 776 (1962).
141. Cf. D. K. McDonald, 3 T.C. 720 (1944).
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make a disposition of it, the nontax standards heretofore formulated should
therefore be applied with the same force to these relatively novel forms as to
those more traditional. And in judging whether a purported transfer of the
good will results in capital gain or ordinary income, the applicable tax stand-
ards and considerations should likewise be the same.
If, for example, a practice conducted in corporate form were sold, in toto,
a disposition, to be entitled to recognition as a sale of the good will, should
include an arrangement which restricts the capacity of the sellers, either in-
dividual or corporate, from interfering with the shift of the good will; a cove-
nant not to compete or an acceptable equivalent ought also to be required.
These conditions should apply whether the total disposition is through a cor-
porate sale of all its assets or by the individuals' sale of all their interests in
the corporation. If one individual alone sells his corporate interest, an effective
disposition of his good will should require assumption of similar restrictions
by him, just as though he were disposing of a partnership interest in a pro-
fessional practice. If the individual disposes of only part of his corporate in-
terest, the same considerations should apply in determining for tax purposes
whether he has sold good will as have been discussed with respect to a pur-
ported partial disposition of professional good will in other contexts. If a
senior joins with one or more juniors to engage in a group practice in corporate
form, and he transfers all his assets, including his good will, to the corporation,
he theoretically retains no residue of good will, his only interest thereafter con-
sisting of his proportionate equity as a shareholder. Superficially it might be
argued that a total disposition of the good will had been made. Functionally,
however, the senior retains the same position with respect to client patronage
as if a partnership had been formed, and in reality the disposition remains of
the type heretofore classified as partial rather than total.
Looking at the situation from the other side, i.e., the implications of the
proposed analysis on the success of these new forms in achieving recognition
as corporations, two observations are pertinent. First, free transferability of
interests is one of the hallmarks of a corporate entity, and the Treasury
Regulations accept as weighing in favor of corporate status for tax purposes
a modified form of transferability under which a member of such an organiza-
iton is allowed to transfer his interest to an outsider only after first having
offered it to his colleagues at its fair market value.142 The point has also been
made that fair market value cannot be paid if the member's good will is in-
cluded in the offer, unless payment is also made for that good will. 43 Here,
in both these respects, the nontax standards discussed previously should be
applied, to determine whether there has been a transfer of good will and
whether, therefore, a payment for it is involved.
Second, and more important, the nontax standards illuminate the extent to
which, as a matter of fact, a practitioner's assets can be put into a corpora-
tion. If a transfer is to be made in accordance with those standards, an appro-
142. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
143. Bittker, supra note 140, at 19-20.
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priate severance must be made between the practitioner and his good will.
Such a severance does not actually occur where a practitioner merely becomes
a member of such a corporate organization; rather, there is only a partial
disposition which, examined as of the time the organization is formed, is un-
ascertainable in extent. In such an arrangement, the practitioner's good will
has not been separated from him, despite any paper appearance to the con-
trary. Since good will in a professional practice is at least a major asset, if
not the most important one, there is ground for claiming that, in substance,
such an organization is not an effective embodiment of the practice and ought
to be disregarded. 44 If this were a matter of first impression, therefore, such
an organization, whether formed under a professional "association" or a pro-
fessional "corporation" statute,145 might be disregarded. 146 However, existing
tax standards relating to the recognition of an organization as a corporation
confer corporate tax status in analogous situations in which the principal assets
of the organization are inseparably bound to certain individuals, 4" and it
would be inconsistent and discriminatory to apply contrary criteria here. To
treat the professional corporation differently, by subordinating doctrine which
otherwise is accepted and applied, would only extend the contradictory patch-
work. 48
10. The Time and Amount of Capital Gain
Determination of the time at which capital gain occurs should depend on the
point at which a qualifying severance and disposition of good will takes place.
In the event of a total disposition of good will, the point of capital gain
realization coincides with the time of disposition. Where the transfer of pro-
fessional good will is in an immediate total disposition, and if such a trans-
action is recognized as resulting in capital gain, the point of disposition and
realization of capital gain clearly occurs at the outset. The result should be the
same, moreover, where the payments, in a transaction which can be identified
as an immediate total disposition, are made in installments. Similarly, if there
is a deferred total disposition prior to which no payments are made, the point
144. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
145. See note 140 supra.
146. This in effect is the direction of the recent proposed amendments to the "Kint-
ner" Regulations, dealing specifically with such professional organizations. See Proposed
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(d) and 301.7701-2(h), 28 Fed. Reg. 13751 (Daily Ed. Dec.
17, 1963).
147. In the area of the professions, defined broadly as in note 1 supra, the incor-
porated insurance agency is an examlpe. Another, similar in substance, is the incorporated
entertainer. Cf. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 543(a) (5) ; Jack Benny, 25 T.C. 197 (1955) ;
Taubman, Motionz Picture Co-Productioo Deals and Theatrical Business Orgatization,
11 TAx L. REv. 113, 117 (1956).
Cf. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949), which despite the
following observation, recognized the separate existence of a corporation: "Undoubtedly
the great majority of corporations owned by sole stockholders are 'dummies' in the
sense that their policies and day-to-day activities are determined not as decisions of the
corporation but by their owners acting individually." Id. at 433.
143. But cf. Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 756, 785 (1962).
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of disposition and realization of capital gain would come at the end of the pro-
jected intervening period.
Where a partial disposition is made, either by a participant who undertakes
a distant retirement obligation or one who makes no retirement commitment,
the nontax standards indicate that no disposition is likely to have occurred
during the intervening period of continued participation by the alleged trans-
feror. In accordance with the analysis proposed herein, no capital gain is
realized on any payment received during that period. Intervening installment
payments would be treated in the same manner where they were made in con-
nection with a deferred total disposition, unless the transaction could be identi-
fied as a total disposition deferred only as a financing mechanism.
This analysis has a bearing on the amount of good will involved in the
disposition and the extent of the capital gain. For example, if a physician buys
a practice and pays $20,000 for the good will, and if he then purports to make
an immediate sale to a new partner of one-half of his good will, committing
himself to sell the other half ten years later, the question arises as to the re-
duction of the amount of capital gain on the ultimate sale by the cost of the
good will. Although no ascertainable disposition can be recognized until the
end of the 10-year period, a partial consumption of the original good will may
nevertheless occur during that period. Although it is not possible to measure
the extent to which that good will has been imperceptibly shifted or consumed
by, for example, the association of the men and their joint enjoyment of the
good will, the judgment of the parties, as shown by their agreement, is that
at the end of the ten-year period the physician has only half of his original
good will to sell, the balance of the good will having been consumed or shifted
in some other fashion. His remaining basis for the good will sold at the end
of that period therefore arguably might be said not to exceed a like propor-
tion of his original basis, which would be one-half his cost or $10,000.149 If
there is a discrepancy between the quantum of good will remaining in such a
transferor and the portion specified in the concluding phase of the arrange-
ment, as may often be the case, it may be treated as shifted to the other par-
ticipant as an inseparable part of the compound of benefits which they have
arranged up to that point rather than as part of the consideration for which
the concluding sales payment is made. In any event, the inexactitude and
difficulty of measurement is the making of the taxpayer, and it may be deemed
not unjust to place on him the burden of the consequential difficulties.
CONCLUSION
If the disposition of professional good will is analyzed to discover what
happens as a matter of fact in such a transaction, and if established tax doc-
trine is applied to these facts, it is difficult to justify capital gains treatment
for the resulting income. Even the immediate total disposition is likely to be
so inseparably submerged in a covenant not to compete or some substitute
149. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957); Commissioner v. Cedar Park Cemetery
Assn., 183 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1950).
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that it ought to be regarded as inherently ineligible for capital gain treatment.
Assuming acceptance of the debatable premise that good will ought to be
treated as a capital commodity in the case of an industrial or mercantile enter-
prise, it does not follow that professional good will is of the same quality and
deserves the same treatment. The assets of the industrial or mercantile busi-
ness have an existence independent of the identity of the owners, so that the
good will of the business usually adheres to those assets and can be trans-
ferred with them. Professional good will, by contrast, normally bears little or
no relation to other properties in the practice, but is bound to -the person of
the practitioner and can be transferred significantly only through his personal
efforts, whether exercised in a negative or affirmative fashion. But the term
"good will" is used indiscriminately without regard to these factual distinc-
tions, as reflected in a widespread, thoughtless submission to the semantic
fallacy that the subject at band is the same because it is called by the same
name. The view is now well entrenched in the tax law that professional good
will is a capital asset.
This factual and doctrinal error ought not to be compounded by extending
it through a like process of semantic transference and intellectual laxity to
partial dispositions of professional good will. These are transactions which
more graphically exhibit their character as ordinary income and demonstrate
more clearly the incongruity in tax principle of the application to them of
capital gains classification. Here precedent is still in the formative stages and
the opportunity is still open to influence the shape which the governing tax
law is to take. The Watson and Rees cases 150 fortunately are as yet only
suggestive of a possible viewpoint rather than illustrative of established law.
In the effort to mold the developing law in the area, the Internal Revenue
Service bears the principal responsibility. To date its performance in prob-
lems of professional good will has been piecemeal and incoherent. It should
instead issue, as quickly as possible, a comprehensive directive concerned with
the principal forms in which these problems appear, presenting the trans-
actions in their proper factual perspective and drawing conclusions as to tax
treatment for which the support of settled principles can be demonstrated.
Such a directive would add to the persuasive weight and influence of Govern-
ment contentions made in litigation, and would also serve the more general
function of guiding not only the courts but also taxpayers, their counsel, and
the personnel of the Service.
In this connection two related matters merit congressional attention. The
Code, in Sections 736 and 751, makes capital gain available on a disposition
of good will by a partner. This is a discriminatory result if the same oppor-
tunity is not available to the individual practitioner and to one who practices
in the new corporate forms. Uniformity of treatment should be prescribed
regardless of the organizational form of practice. One means of attaining that
objective would be a provision which simply declared that professional good
150. 35 T.C. 203 (1960); 187 F. Supp. 924 (D. Ore. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 295
F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1961).
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will is a capital asset. Rather than spawning spurious capital gains and further
distending the tax law, however, it would be preferable to take a contrary
approach and recognize that a disposition of professional good will, to the
extent that it anticipates future ordinary income, tends to concentrate that
income in a single year or some other short period and may give rise to a
greater tax burden than would be incurred over the longer term of its natural
realization. To deal with this situation, which is the real harshness in treating
a professional good will disposition as an ordinary income transaction, the
needed response is a statutory income-averaging device. 151 Such a provision
would bring a uniformity of treatment regardless of organizational form,
allowing both total and partial dispositions to be recognized as ordinary in-
come transactions. By comparison, as a substitute measure to mitigate the
same burden, the capital gains treatment now conferred by the courts and to
a lesser extent by the Code, is overly bountiful in permitting a tax at less
than ordinary income rates and in an amount less than probably would be
paid if the income were realized in its normal course.
151. Cf. President Kennedy's special message on tax reduction and reform, Jan. 24,
1963, proposing a broadly applicable income averaging provision to be included in the
then proposed Revenue Act of 1963, and which was adopted as §§ 1301-1305 of the 1954
Code by Sec. 232 of the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. 272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., (Feb.
26, 1964).
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